The Continuing Scourge of Air Rage

by Andrew Thomas August 2007

The years after the 9/11 attacks have been marked by a commitment on the part of the TSA in the USA and other agencies around the world, seemingly to do everything possible to create new layers of aviation security. Dishearteningly many of those new layers have often been inefficient, expensive and insecure. However except for a few dissenting voices, most taxpayers, bureaucrats, passengers and industry insiders have accepted this strategy with barely the slightest hesitation.

The simple fact that it could be done meant that it was - and almost nobody asked whether it should. But as one looks back it is clear that the difference between ‘could' and ‘should' is often the same as that between real security and insecurity. Just because it was possible to spend tens of billions of dollars to federalize screeners, reconfigure airports, expand the air marshal program, invest in antiquated explosive detection technology and explore the use of biometrics didn't mean that it should have been done. In fact the evidence is overwhelming that in many situations things would have been better left alone. And, many areas that needed attention were simply ignored.

The fundamental issues facing aviation security planners today is which of the many security measures put in place after 9/11 will go; which should remain; and, which vulnerabilities need to be addressed. The answers to these questions may very well determine the future of the global air transport industry more than any other factor.

Effective aviation security measures represent a combination of activities and techniques that are aimed at giving the system a strong assurance of deterrence, prevention and detection. Given that aviation security resources are finite, and that security measures must be promoted in the context of other constraints, it is not possible to buy security by implementing all available measures. Trade-offs must be made and consequently there needs to be a strategy in place to determine which measures are to be employed and how.

The Scope of the Problem

The perpetrators of violence - most likely terrorists, criminals or disruptive passengers - act against the system in several ways. Individuals or groups may pose different levels of danger. The severity of the perpetrators' attack is thus a variable. In short, all attackers and all attacks are not the same. The severity of an attack by a drug courier or an upset passenger who didn't get an upgrade is not nearly as strong as a determined terrorist who is on a mission to sacrifice his life in order to bring down an airliner. Resources of the perpetrator vary as well. Different perpetrators use various resources including skills, tools, motivation and opportunity.

The actions of disruptive passengers are often the most overlooked element when trying to recognize the role violence plays within the aviation system. Although terrorist and criminal acts against aviation receive much more attention from both policy planners and the media, disruptive passengers pose a much more pervasive, ongoing threat. The sheer number of cases that take place every year evidences this.

In the U.S. there have been 1,750 documented air-rage incidents since 2000, according to the Federal Aviation Administration. Thousands of more incidents have gone unreported. Data from the FAA, which only tracks the handful of incidents that are reported by the airline crews, show the average number of rage incidents was about 248 a year from 2000 through 2006. From 1995 through 1999, there were 198 incidents a year on average. The reporting mechanism is woefully inadequate for the problem. There could be as many as 10,000 actual air-rage incidents a year in the U.S. alone

Woefully Dealt With...

Yet, despite the plethora of new aviation security measures currently put in place, the critical issue of disruptive passengers has barely hit the radar screen. This is unfortunate, given the number of out-of-control passengers witnessed both before and after the September 11 terrorist attacks. In the 24 months leading up to September 11, 2001, there were 30 documented cockpit intrusions by disruptive passengers on commercial carriers. Clearly, the plans of the terrorists who destroyed the World Trade Center and damaged the Pentagon were predicated upon their ability to enter the cockpit and fly the planes into their targets. The actions of disruptive passengers and the total lack of response by authorities to deal with the problem instructed the 9-11 terrorists on the ease with which they could enter the cockpit. This education continues.

Dr. Andrew Thomas is assistant professor of international business and director of the Center for Organizational Development at the University of Akron, Ohio, USA. Andrew is the founder and Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Transportation Security [JOTS]. His website can be found at www.airrage.com